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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES
itutive/declaratory debate. The speculative issue
is whether this European movement heralds the
beginning of a larger trend towards collective
mechanisms of state recognition and, if so, what
effect that will have on the nature of the state
and, more generally, on international law.
VALERIE EPps
Suffolk University Law School
Theory and Reality in the International Protection of
HumanRights. ByJ. Shand Watson. Ardsley NY
Transnational Publishers, 1999. Pp. x, 325.
Index. $115.
Human rights law, arguably the fastest growing
field in international law, has achieved a moral
plateau that is unique in international affairs. As
noted by two leading human rights scholars,
Henry Steiner and Philip Alston, in just over "a
mere half century, the human rights movement
that grew out of the Second World War has be-
come an indelible part of our legal, political and
moral landscape."' There is a now a presumption
that the assertion of an entitlement acquires
virtually irrefutable validity once it is transformed
into a human right. As Louis Henkin has noted,
"human rights is today the single, paramount
virtue to which vice pays homage, that govern-
ments today do not feel free to preach what they
may persist in practicing."2 In other words, inter-
national human rights law is real, effective, and
an obligatory regime of global civilization today.
Yet it is precisely this truism that J. Shand
Watson of Mercer University LawSchool seeks to
debunk. The thrust of his argument is both simple
and clear: the yawning gulf between theory and
practice renders human rights lawa meaningless
facade that has substance only in the abstracted
minds of academics. In the eleven chapters of
Theory and Reality in the International Protection of
Human Rights, Watson emphasizes the same
theme over and over again: international law is
impotent and cannot prevent oppression within
the borders of sovereign states. Watson charges
that the "academic community would be well
advised to stop making extravagant claims about
what international law can do for the oppressed,
and instead analyse the reasons for the lack of
success of the human rights idea" (p. x). Watson
wants to talk about the death of the idea of
I See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTER-
NATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, PoLIICS,
MORALS 3 (2d ed. 2000).
2 LOuiS HENKiN, THEAGEOFRIGHTS, at ix-x (1990).
human rights. But in choosing to focus on the
issue of enforcement as such, Watson fails to
address the penetration of the idea of human
rights within almost all states, and he does not
take into account the implications of such pene-
tration for the cultural, political, and historical
legitimacy of human rights.
Wielding a relentless, if somewhat blunt,
Austinian machete, Watson embarks on a positi-
istic crusade whose sole purposes are to disembowel
the human rights movement and, conversely, to
restore the supremacy of state sovereignty. The
opening chapter is little more than a catalogue
of human rights violations that have met with
international inaction and acquiescence. He notes
that atrocities of the past, such as the Inquisition
and the destruction of Carthage, "are not sepa-
rate and isolated historical events that occurred
at a time when human nature was vastly worse
than it is today" (p. 1). Nay, they are on "a con-
tinuum leading ineluctably to the massive slaugh-
ters in Russia and Cambodia, the genocide of the
Indian populations in North and South America,
the starvation of Ethiopian citizens by their
government, and the tribal excesses in Rwanda
and Burundi" (id.). To these, he could have
added slavery, colonialism, apartheid, imperial
conquests and exploitation, the vagaries of an
unjust global economic order, and the Holo-
caust, to name just a few. Watson then mocks
human rights treaties and other binding interna-
tional human rights instruments as wishful think-
ing. He points to repeated failures to enforce
these interhational obligations when gruesome
atrocities have been committed. It is this distance
between facts on the ground and lofty inter-
national human rights norms that, in Watson's
view, makes human rights fictitious.
At various points in the book, Watson decries
what he calls the wrong choice of legal theory in
the human rights area. In one chapter, for ex-
ample, he concentrates on the lack of sanctions
or power to enforce human rights because of ill-
conceived theories that model international law
on "the typical domestic hierarchy" (p. 47). He
argues in another chapter that sanctions have
rarelyworked because individual states cannotbe
forced to honor them. Moreover, the United
Nations is impotent to make states comply. He
notes that if custom is the true practice of states,
then the norm is in the breach, not observance,
of human rights. In discussing the ineffectiveness
of UN resolutions on human rights, he contends
that states sign on because they know that such
texts are only formally binding, presumably
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because they have no bite. Wherever he looks,
national rights trump human rights.
While Watson certainly raises several important
questions, his central claims are fatally flawed in
fundamental ways. It is certainly true that there
is a gaping and frustrating gap between the
noble aspirations of human rights and the egre-
gious violations that continue to characterize
state practice in every country in the world. Inter-
national institutions, and particularly the United
Nations, have been quite ineffectual-and in
most instances, disastrously so-in enforcing
human rights.3 The failures are painfully obvious.
In the recent past, failures by the international
community to respond to human rights viola-
tions-even to genocide, as was the case in 1994
in Rwanda-have underscored the difficulties
that bedevil the international enforcement of
human rights norms. In the cases of Rwanda and
Sierra Leone-and before them, Somalia-the
unwillingness and inability of the United Nations
to act responsibly reflected not a decision to
respect the sovereignty of these states, but a
decision by the West not to expend resources in
a part of the world it deemed worthless.' More
generally-and contrary to what Shand asserts-
respectfor sovereignty is onlyafacade that masks
the underlying political or other reasons for
decisions not to intervene in response to signifi-
cant human rights violations.
Although the United Nations is obviously a
creature and institution of sovereign states and is
therefore bound by its Charter to respect the
sovereignty of its members, it has in recent years
taken a more active posture toward the enforce-
ment of human rights. The UN debacles in
Rwanda and Somalia-as well as its inability to
respond effectively to the atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia-embarrassed the world body and
drew attention to the urgent need for more
effective intervention. The creation of the Inter-
national Tribunals for RwandaP and for the
' See Implications of International Response to Events
in Rwanda, Kosovo Examined by Secretary-General, in
Address to General Assembly, UN Press Release
GA/9595 (Sept. 20, 1999), obtainable from <http://
www.un.org> (UN NewsCentre); Makau wa Mutua,
LookingPast the HumanRights Committee: AnArgumentfor
De-MarginalizingEnforcement, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
211 (1998).
4 See UN DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, UNITED
NATIONS AND RWANDA: 1993-1996 (1996), UN Sales
No. E.96.I.20; Peter Rosenblum, Dodging the Challenge,
10 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 313 (1997).
' See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955, UN
Doc. S/1995/134 (1994).
Former Yugoslavia, as well as the adoption in
December 1998 in Rome of the statute of the
international criminal court,7 evidences the
desire to create more effective organs for en-
forcement. It is important to note that all of
these actions came after long periods of resis-
tance and opposition by major Western powers,
including the United States, and only after
intense public scrutiny and unrelenting media
coverage. The United Nations has a maze of
Charter bodies and treaties-from the Commis-
sion on Human Rights, to the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-that are
slowly building practice and norms in the en-
forcement of human rights.8 In addition, regional
organizations, such as the European Union,9 the
Organization of American States," and the
Organization of African Unity," have in varying
degrees started to emphasize human rights and
to take steps to enforce them. While grim, the
picture is not as hopeless as Watson would have
us believe. There is halting, if painfully slow and
cautious, movement towards enforcement.
Contrary to what Watson suggests, the spread
and effectiveness of human rights norms are not
best assessed through the lens of international
enforcement. Instead, one should look at the
dramatic and transformative impact of human
rights norms on the legal, constitutional, and
political cultures of states. The true test for the
effectiveness of human rights law is not at the
vertical level-that is, where international insti-
tutions act on domestic legal orders-but rather
in the assimilation and adoption of human rights
norms by and within states. Seen from this per-
spective, human rights norms have had an al-
most miraculous impact on the psyches of states,
cultures, and societies around the world. As is
evident today, the idea of constitutionalism-and
with it, liberal constitutions themselves-has
spread worldwide. This legal paradigm, which is
6 See SC Res. 808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
7 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.138/9* (1998).
8 See THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CRrFIcALAPPRAISAL (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
' See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Towards a Theory of Supranational Effective Adjudication,
107 YALE LJ. 273 (1997).
" See Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights:
Reflections on ajoint Venture, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 439 (1990).
1 See ChidiAnselm Odinkalu, Thelndividual Complaints
Procedure of the African Commission on Human andPeoples'
Rights: A Preliminary Assessment, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 359 (1998).
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integrally connected with human rights, is creat-
ing societies whose guiding principles are driven
by human rights. A case in point is the South
African post-apartheid state, which I have called
a "human rights state." 2 Henkin has captured
the power of human rights in this bold passage:
Ours is the age of rights. Human rights is
the idea of our time, the only political-moral
idea that has received universal acceptance.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the United Nations General As-
sembly in 1948, has been approved by vir-
tually all governments representing all soci-
eties. Human rights are enshrined in the
constitutions ofvirtually every one of today's
170 states-old states and new; religious,
secular, and atheist; Western and Eastern;
democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian;
market economy, socialist, and mixed; rich
and poor, developed, developing, and less
developed. Human rights is the subject of
numerous international agreements, the
daily grist of the mills of international poli-
tics, and a bone of continuing contention
among superpowers.'3
The penetration of human rights below the
surface of the state-their entry into, and effec-
tive governance of, most legal systems today-is
the single most important measure of the success
of the idea of human rights. Instead of dying, as
Watson suggests, the idea of human rights has
now become an integral part of the fabric of
societies throughout the world. Domestic legal
systems-that is, in effect, sovereign states-are
now enforcing human rights because they consti-
tute domestic law. What is more, civil-society
organizations in many countries now vigilantly
police government respect for, and guarantees
of, basic human rights. The fact that human rights
laws are nevertheless violated does not distin-
guish them from other species of rights or obli-
gations in criminal law, tort law, or contract law.
In focusing on enforcement as the exclusive
measure of the success or failure of the human
rights project, Watson draws attention awayfrom
the one critical shortcoming that continues to
vex that project. In my view, the human rights
corpus is a fundamentally Eurocentric doctrine
that consequently suffers from several basic biases.
Precisely because that corpus falls squarelywithin
the historical continuum of the colonial project-
in which a superior and a subordinate are the
essential actors-it lacks genuine cross-cultural
12 Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despairfor a New South
Africa: The Limits of Rights Discourse, 10 HARv. HUM. RTs.
J. 63, 65 (1997).
13 HENKIN, supra note 2, at ix.
legitimacy. Its rhetoric and discourse are arro-
gant and abusive of non-European, nonliberal
traditions and cultures. 4 Although it is possible
that a genuinely universal discourse may emerge
concerning the nature of human dignity and the
types of political arrangements that can best pro-
tect that dignity, there needs to be a recognition
that the current human rights corpus is, in effect,
just one proposal for what that universal discourse
ought to be. An excavation of diverse traditions is
necessaryifa deep, lasting, and universal agreement
on a regime of human rights is to be achieved. In
the meantime, Watson's Theory and Reality in the
InternationalProtection ofHuman Rightsis a valuable
reminder not only of the vexing problems of
enforcement, but also of the urgent need for
scholarship that probes the complexity of the
human rights project.
MAKAU MUTUA
SUN Y-Buffalo School of Law
Remedies in International Human Rights Law. By
Dinah Shelton. Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999. Pp. xli, 379. Index.-
$130, cloth; $35, paper.
The past half century of rule enunciation has
produced a comprehensive body ofinternational
human rights norms. Through both treaties and
customary law, states are now prohibited from
committing a long list of abuses and are obli-
gated to provide remedies for those whose rights
have been violated. Enforcement, however, re-
mains the Achilles' heel of the human rights,
system. In practice, rights are frequently violated
and remedies rarely available. Meaningful redress
remains no more than a distant hope for most
victims of human rights abuses. The remedy
"deficit" persists despite the remarkable growth
of multinational, state, and nongovernmental
institutions scrutinizing human rights practices
and attempting to enforce human rights norms.
A host of public and private organizations moni-
tor human rights practices, issue recommenda-
tions, and hear complaints of human rights
abuses. Nevertheless, these bodies address only a
tiny portion of the human rights abuses committed
around the world. Although often successful in
drawing attention to a wide range of violations
and furthering the definition of human rights
4 SeeMakau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The
Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201
(2001); Makau wa Mutua, TheIdeology of Human Rights,
36 VA.J. INT'L L. 589 (1996).
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